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CASE COMMENTS
been totally barred even if assumption of risk had not been applic-
able.3 4 It made little difference which defense was applied. However,
in the Wisconsin case of Severson, the parties were not equally at fault,
so that contributory negligence would have been ineffective as a total
bar.35 Assumption of risk, being available, was therefore applied to
achieve this result.
The doctrine of comparative negligence has been adopted in large
part from a dissatisfaction with the harshness of contributory negli-
gence which places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for
which both are responsible.30 Although this expansion of liability is
worthwhile and progressive in many aspects, the doctrine does come
into sharp conflict with the current trend to limit the liability of a host
to a gratuitous guest in automobile cases. Because comparative negli-
gence statutes and guest statutes are both of recent origin in the field
of torts, it is not strange that this conflict has developed. It is in this
area of conflict that the distinction between voluntary assumption
of risk and contributory negligence has important practical conse-
quences. The same policy underlying the enactment of guest statute
legislation in Michigan, i.e., to prevent recovery by a non-paying guest
from his host,37 is perhaps a strong reason why Wisconsin, even with
a comparative negligence statute, adheres to the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk in all its common law rigor.
ANDRFW W. 'McTHENIA, JR.
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE OR GROUND OF DIVORCE
Acts of outrageous conduct by a spouse who is mentally ill often
bring about divorce proceedings by the injured partner. At one time in
the history of divorce law in Pennsylvania, insanity was not a defense
to acts that constituted a ground of divorce.1 However, most American
4o105 N.W.2d at 403.
'In Wisconsin recovery under the comparative negligence statute is allowed
unless the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant's. See
Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law, 1932 Wis. L. Rev. 222, 227.
"Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 Cornell L.Q. 333,
6o (1932); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465 (953).
3'Richards, supra note 15.
I Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 47 Am. Dec. 466 (1847). In this case the wife
acted under the impulse of nymphomania, but irrespective of the type, insanity was
said not to be a bar to a divorce action on the ground of insanity. Chief Justice
Gibson, who decided the Matchin case, had, in an earlier case, equated moral in-
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courts, disregarding the intolerable plight of the sane spouse, follow
the general rule that insanity as determined by the M'Naghten Rule,2
i.e., the right-wrong test, is a defense to a divorce action on any
ground 3 From time to time courts have attempted to break away from
this traditional rule by adopting a different standard for determining
insanity, in the belief that the test should be less stringent than in
criminal cases. These courts are then faced with the difficult problem
of defining the legal level of insanity necessary to excuse the de-
fendant's conduct as a ground of divorce.
An example of such a venture to find a middle ground is found in
the recent Pennsylvania case of Manley v. Manley4 wherein the hus-
sanity with the right-wrong test, see Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
Neither idea has stood the test of time. See Commonwealth v. Novak. 395 Pa. 199.
15o A.2d 102 (1959).
'This rule as to criminal responsibility was established in M'Naghten's Case,
io Clark & F. 2o0. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). This right-wrong idea gradually cristal-
lized into the present right-wrong test. See Perkins, Criminal Law 746-51 (1957). For
discussion and evaluation of these tests and others, see generally id. at 746-76. In
regard to raising the defense of insanity to criminal acts in Virginia, see Note, 18
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 365 (1961).
3The cases cited herein refer only to grounds of absolute divorce and several
illustrate very close questions of fact in regard to insanity as a defense to the
respective grounds. Cox v. Cox, 268 Ala. 572, 109 So. 2d 703 (1959) (abandonment);
Wray v. Wray, 19 Ala. 522 (1851) (adultery); Myers v. Myers. 266 Ark. 632, 29.1
S.W.2d 67 (1956) (indignities); Trethewey v. Trethewey, 115 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959) (extreme cruelty); Carlson v. Calrson, 308 IIl. App. 675, 32 N.E.2d
365 (1941) (extreme cruelty); Bouska v. Bouska, 249 Iowa 281, 86 N.W.2d 884 (1957)
(inhuman treatment); Pile v. Pile, 94 Ky. 308, 22 S.W. 215 (1893) (desertion);
Hadley v. Hadley, 144 Me. 127, 65 A.2d 8 (1949) (cruel and abusive treatment);
Bowersock v. Bowersock, 210 Md. 427, 123 A.2d 9o9 (1956) (desertion); Rice v.
Rice, 332 Mass. 489, 125 N.E.2d 787 (1955) (cruelty); Broadstreet v. Broadstreet,
7 Mass. 474 (1811) (adulter)); Fansler v. Fansler, 344 Mich. 569, 75 N.W.2d I
(1956) (cruelty); Gardner v. Gardner, 239 Mch. 306, 214 N.W. 133 (1927) (extreme
cruelty); Kunz v. Kunz, 171 Minn. 258, 213 N.W. 9o6 (1927) (cruelty and inhuman
treatment); Walker v. Walker, 140 Miss. 340, 105 So. 753 (1925) (desertion);
Niedergerke v. Niedergerke, 271 S.V.2d 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (indignities);
Schieck v. Schieck, 5 Neb. Unof. 142, 97 N.W. 474 (1903) (adultery); Storrs v.
Storrs, 68 N.H. 118, 34 AdI. 672 (1894) (desertion); Bailey v. Bailey, 115 N.J. Eq.
565, 171 AtI. 797 (1934) (adultery); Youmans v. Youmans, 3 N.J. Misc. 576, 129
Atl. 122 (1925) (extreme cruelty); Laudo v. Laudo, 188 App. Div. 699, 177 N.Y.
Supp. 396 (1919) (adultery); Heim v. Heim, 35 Ohio App. 4o8, 172 N.E. 451 (1930)
(extreme cruelty); Nelson v. Nelson, 350 P.2d 702 (Ore. 196o) (cruel and inhuman
treatment); Schwarzkopf v. Schwarzkopf, 176 Pa. Super. 441, 107 A.2d 61o (1954)
(indignities); Benjeski v. Benjeski, 15o Pa. Super 57, 27 A.2d 266 (1942) (indignities
and cruel and inhuman treatment); Fomby v. Fomby, 329 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) (adultery); Cobb v. Cobb, 19 Wash. 2d 697, 143 P.2d 856 (1943) (cruelty and in-
dignities). For a general analysis see Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 144 (1951.
4193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960).
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band sued for an absolute divorce .5 on the grounds of adultery and
indignities." The master in chancery recommended the granting of a
divorce on both grounds since the medical history of the wife did
show insanity at the time the alleged acts were committed.7 The trial
court concluded that the indignities should be excused, because the
wife was mentally ill, but granted a divorce on the ground of adultery
as insanity had not been established as a defense to that charge. The
wife appealed. 8
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in this instance was presented
with a question that has vexed the courts of that state since 1847 when
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Matchin v. Matchin9 hold-
ing that insanity was not a defense to divorce on the ground of adult-
ery.10 That decision was apparently based on the moral seriousness of
the charge, and the idea that the innocent husband might be forced
to accept the offspring resulting from such immoral conduct. This
rule was subjected to a great deal of criticism by courts of other juris-
dictions,"1 and it was virtually distinguished out of existence by later
Pennsylvania cases, which held insanity was a sufficient defense to
r "Divorce is the legal separation of husband and wife by the judgment of a
court. There are two kinds: (a) It may dissolve the marriage, in which case it is
called a divorce 'a viniculo matrimonii.) [This is synonymous with the term absolute
divorce.] (b) It may suspend the effect of the marriage only in so far as cohabitation
is concerned, in which case it is called a divorce 'a mensa et thoro,' or judicial
separation. [Commonly called a divorce from bed and board not herein consid-
ered.]" Madden. Persons & Domestic Relations § 82 (1931).
6"Grounds for divorce from bond of matrimony. When a marriage has been
heretofore or shall hereafter be contracted, it shall be lawful for the innocent and
injured spouse to obtain a divorce from the bond of matrimony, whenever it shall
be judged, in the manner hereinafter provided, that the other spouse: ...
(c) Shall have committed adultery; or...
(f) Shall have offered such indignities to the person of the injured and in-
nocent spouse, as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burden-
some...." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 23 § 1o (1955).
7193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113-16 (1960). The wife had been under care in
two institutions but never adjudged insane. Records of her care and condition
were not made available by the doctors who testified in her behalf. It is interesting
to note that one of the doctors had never seen the defendant wife and the other
based his testimony on only three visits. For this and other reasons most of this
evidence was excluded, but the superior court stated that even if this evidence
had been admitted it was not sufficient to establish the defense.
8Manley v. Manley, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 164 (Del. Co. 195o) .
1'6 Pa. 332, 47 Am. Dec. 466 (1847).
'OId. at 336, 47 Am. Dec. at 467.
uWray v. Wray, '9 Ala. 522 (1851); Storrs v. Storrs, 68 N. H. 118, 34 AtI. 672
(1894); Hill v. Hill, 27 N.J. Eq. 214 (1876); Nichols v. Nichols, 31 Vt. 328, 73 Am. Dec.
352 (1858).
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charges of less serious moral conduct than adultery.' 2 In upholding the
trial court's finding of fact that the wife was not legally insane at the
time adultery was committed, the superior court affirmed the granting
of the divorce on that ground.
Refusing to follow even the last vestiges of the Matchin case,'2
the court said it would recognize insanity as a compelte defense to
divorce on the ground of adultery when the party so afflicted was un-
able to understand the nature and the consequences of her acts or
to distinguish between right and wrong.14 This right-wrong test, the
rule in criminal cases in Pennsylvania, 5 is the one most frequently
adopted by other states recognizing insanity as a defense to a divorce
suit.16
While the court adopted the general rule that insanity may be a
defense to divorce on the ground of adultery, it used a less stringent
standard than the traditional right-wrong test to determine whether a
spouse's disability is a defense to acts of less serious moral conduct than
adultery. This is shown by the superior court's affirmance of the trial
court's decision that the wife's mental illness excused her from the
indignities charge "on the theory that such conduct lacks the spirit
of hate, estrangement and malevolence which is the heart of the charge
of indignities."'17 This court seems to balance the moral seriousness
of the conduct against the degree of mental incapacity proved in order
to determine whether insanity has been established as a defense.
Though the balancing process is contrary to the weight of author-
ity, the Pennsylvania court in the Manley case is not the only court
suggesting this approach. The Ohio case of Nelson v. Nelson's took a
similar view:
"The rule in criminal cases, (where insanity is claimed as a
defense), that to be relieved of criminal responsibility for crim-
"-TIhe Pennsylvania decisions have been handed down by the superior court
only, since the supreme court has not spoken on this question in many years. See
Carle v. Carle, 192 Pa. Super. 490, 162 A.2d 38 (196o); Braun v. Braun, 186 Pa.
Super. 26o, 142 A.2d- 361 (1958); Barnes v. Barnes, 181 Pa. Super. 427, 124 A.2d
646 (1956); Schwarzkopf v. Schwarzkopf, 176 Pa. Super. 441, 107 A.2d 61o (1954);
Benjeski v. Benjeski, 150 Pa. Super. 57, 27 A.2d 266 (1942).
"Save adultery, all other cases of absolute divorce had permitted insanity to
stand as a defense to the wrongful conduct when the requirements of the right-
wrong test had been met. See note 12 supra.
1t193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113, 120 (1960).
"Commonwealth v. Lockard, 325 Pa. 56, x88 Ad. 755 (1937). The irresistible im-
pulse test has been rdjected in Pennsylvania. For an interesting discussion of the
problem see Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
"See note 3 supra.
"TManley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113, 120 (196o).
"s1o8 Ohio App. 365, 154 N.E.2d 653 (1958).
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inal acts, the defendant must not have been able to distinguish
between right and wrong would have no application where one
party to the marital relation becomes mentally ill by reason
of which his conduct becomes abnormal."'
19
The degree of insanity, something less than the criminal test, that
the Ohio court recognizes as a bar to divorce is unclear from the opin-
ion.20 Lord Justice Denning dissented in part in the English case of
White v. White2 which held that the right-wrong test should be used
as the test of insanity as a defense to divorce on all grounds, irrespective
of the moral gravity of the offense.22 He stated that he thought the test
in divorce actions should be less strict than that applied in criminal
actions, emphasizing the sane spouse's knowledge of the other's mental-
ly deficient condition during the period when the wrongful conduct
occurred.23 Thus where one spouse seeks divorce on the ground of
cruelty, the defense of insanity might be a bar to divorce if the conduct
were not criminal, while not sufficient to excuse if the conduct were
criminal. The Manley case seems to have arrived at substantially the
same conclusion.
An earlier superior court decision, Benjeski v. Benjeski,24 not over-
ruled by the Manley case, was in accord with the majority American
view that "the law does not undertake to distinguish among the various
degrees of control short of insanity, and select those which prevent a
divorce and those which do not."25 This majority view spares the
courts the problem of making difficult distinctions in the tests to apply
to divorce grounds of less moral consequences than adultery. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not spoken on the questions
presented by the Manley case in some years, and the decisions of the
lower courts remain in irreconcilable conflict.26 A further complica-
'Id. at 657.
-"rhe court only states that it is upholding the factual determination of the
trial court and cites no authority from which one could arrive at the basis of the
less stringent standard suggested by the Ohio court. See Heim v. Heim, 35 Ohio
App. 1o8, 172 N.E..451 (1930).
[195o] P- 39, ig A.L.R.2d 130 (1951).
1Id. at 52, 19 A.L.R.2d at '39.
'old. at 6o, 19 A.L.R.2d at 143-44. See Annot., ig A.L.R.2d 144 (195t), for a
general discussion of insanity as bar to divorce.
2'I5o Pa. Super. 57, 27 A.2d 266 (1942).
27 A.2d at 267 (other quotes deleted). The quotation is attributed to Kruse v.
Kruse. 179 Md. 657, 22 A.2d 475 (1941), but the report of the Kruse case does
not tontain such a quotation. The dates are suggestive that the court in Benjeski
was using the advance sheet report, which was changed by the time the final volume
was put in print. The Kruse case involved insanity as a defense to a divorce a
mensa et thoro on the ground of constructive desertion.
23Compare Manley v. Manley 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d U3, with Benjeski
v. Benjeski, 150 Pa. Super. 57, 27 A.2d 266 (1942).
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tion underlying the Manley rule is that Pennsylvania does not grant
divorces on the ground of incurable insanity.27 The innocent sane
party has no legal way to terminate the marital relationship, factually
destroyed, with the insane spouse. To alleviate the difficult position
of the sane spouse, several states have passed statutes making incurable
insanity a ground of divorce.28 The terms of these acts regarding the
procedure to prove incurable insanity vary from state to state. The
length of time the spouse must be incurably insane also varies, the
average being three to five years.29
ZrAt one time Pennsylvania had a statute allowing a divorce on the ground of
incurable insanity. See note 20 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 641 (1959).
-At the present time 29 states have such statutes in one form or the other;
these are cited in note 29 infra.
To illustrate how decisions may vary depending upon whether a jurisdiction
has this type of statute, the following provides an interesting comparison. Virginia
does not have such a statute, but in fact has a statute which denies insanity as a
defense to divorce on the ground of desertion, where the insanity occurs within
one year after the desertion commenced. Va. Code Ann. § 20-93 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
There have bein no appellate decisions on this point in Virginia. Alabama and
North Carolina, which have statutes permitting the granting of a divorce on the
ground of incurable insanity, have denied divorces in this situation. See Cox v. Cox,
268 Ala. 383, 109 So. 2d 703 (1959) (abandonment); Kendall v. Kendall, 268 Ala.
572, io6 So. 2d 653 (1958) (abandonment); Moody v. Moody, 117 S.E.2d 724 (N.C.
1961) (separation).
2This refers only to absolute divorce sections and to the length of time of
incurable insanity on the part of the defendant spouse required to bring the action.
In most states the statute provides for support of the insane spouse, but some
states leave this to the discretion of the court, and in still others there is another
general statute dealing with the subject of support.
Ala. Code tit. 34, § 20(7) (Recomp. 1958) (5 successive years); Alaska Comp.
Laws Ann. § 56-5-7(8) (1949) (3 years prior to the action); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-
1202(8) (Supp. 1959) (3 years prior to suit); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 92-(7), 1O8 (1954) (3
years confinement immediately preceding the action); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
46-1-1 (1953) (5 years adjudged insane prior to the action); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46-19
(Re. 1958), § 46-13 (Supp. 1959) (an accummulated period totaling 5 years within
the period-of 6 years next preceding the date of the complaint in such action);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1522(10) (Supp. 196o) (recurrent mentally ill person under
supervision or care of an institution for mental diseases a period of 5 years); Ga.
Code Ann. § 3o-102(11) (1952) (confined in an institution 3 years immediately
preceding the comhencement of the action); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 324-20o(d) (1955)
(3 years next preceding the action); Idaho Code Ann. § 32-603(7). § 32-801 (Supp.
1959) (3 years continued period of insanity).
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-101o(8) (Repl. Vol. 1946) (insanity, confined for a period
of at least 5 years); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-15o01() (Supp. 1959) (5 years insane,
confined in an institution); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.020(5) (a-d) (Supp. 1961) (confined
in institution for 5 successive years prior to the filing of petition for divorce); Md.
Ann. Code art. 16 § 26 (1957) (3 years confined in asylum prior to filing bill of com-
plaint); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 5s8-o6 (Supp. g6o) (confined in institution for at least
3 years prior to the action); Miss. Code Ann. § 2735(12) (Recomp. 1957) (3 years
confinement immediately preceding the commencement of the action); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 42-301(7) (Repl. Vol. 196o) (confined for 5 years immediately preceding
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One of the most liberal of these stautes was enacted in the state
of 'Washington in 1949, the pertinent section reading as follows:
"In all cases where the defendant, at the time of the com-
mencement of the action, is suffering from chronic mania or
dementia, established by competent medical testimony to have
existed for two years prior to the filing of the complaint, such
insanity shall be the sole and exclusive ground upon which
the court, may in its discretion, grant a divorce."30
This type of statute was adopted to protect the incompetent spouse
from being divorced on grounds other than insanity, when in fact the
ground of divorce was related to mental illness.31 The Supreme Court
of Washington however, has interpreted the statute to mean that
where the insanity of the defendant has not existed as long as two
years prior to the filing of the action, the defense of insanity is not
available under any circumstances.32 Therefore, if wife W is sane at
the time of the action, but she was insane for a two year period at the
time the alleged conduct occurred, she may plead the previous in-
sanity as a defense. However, if W is insane at the commencement of
the action, but has not been insane for two years she cannot plead
insanity as a defense.33 Although this interpretation appears inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the legislature, the theory behind such a
statute is sound.
the action): Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.010(8) (196o) (insanity existing 2 years prior to
action): N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-7 (1953) (insanity existing 5 years preceding the
filing of a complaint): N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-5(g) (Supp. 196o) (5 years living apart
because of incurable insanity): N.D. Code Ann. § 14-0503(7) (196o) (5 years in con-
iinement): Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § i27102,) (Supp. 1959) (insanity for a period of 5
%ears, confined in an institution): Ore. Rev. Stat. § 107.030 (1959) (adjudged mentally
ill by a competent court of jurisdiction for 3 years prior to the action); S.D. Code
§ 14.0703(7) (1939) (5 )ears insanity, confinement by a court of record or commis-
sion): Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4629(6) (196o) adjudged insane and confined to
pubic or private asylum for a period of 5 )ears next preceding the commencement
ot the action); Utah Code Ann. § 3o-3-1(9) (Supp. 1959) (duly adjudged insane
for 5 )ears); Vt. Stat. tit. 15, §§ 551(g), 631-37 (1958) (confined in mental institution
for 5 years): Wash. Rev. Code § 26.08.020(10) (1959) (2 years insanity prior to the
filing of the action); W)o. Stat. Ann. § 20-39 (1957) (insane for at least 2 years
preceding the acton).
"Wash. Rev. Code § 26.o8.020(10) (1959)- (Emphasis added.) It has been inti-
mated in one decision that the insanity must be of an incurable nature in order to
,tie successfully for divorce on that ground; Cobb v. Cobb, 19 Wash. 2d 697, 143
P.2(d 856 (943). For similar statutes see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.o0(8) (196o); Wyo.
Cosip. Stat. Ann. § 20-39 (1957).
"'Note. 24 Wash. L. Rev. 123, 124 (1949). See also, 23 Wash. L. Rev. 307,
321 (1948).
3Rieke, The Divorce Act of 1949-One Decade Later, 35 Wash. L. Rev. 16,
2o (196o). See especially, id. at 2o, note 33.
mIbid.
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The rul6 followed prior to the passage of the statute had recognized
insanity as a defense to a divorce action.3 4 Thus if the earlier rule and
the* statute were considered together, the intent of the legislature
would be carried out. For example, assume husband H sues wife W for
divorce on the ground of cruelty and W answers affirmatively relying
on insanity as a defense: if the period of insanity is of less than two
years duration, the court will allow insanity to stand as a defense and
dismiss the action. But when the insanity has existed for more than two
years, the affirmative allegation of insanity by wife will bring the
statute into operation and the court will grant a divorce on the
ground of insanity. Thus H would have a way of being released from
the marriage, and W would get proper support and not be labeled
the party at fault.
The several techniques used to dispose of the problem of insanity
in divorce proceedings lead to the inescapable conclusion that no
single one is satisfactory. Notwithstanding, the following provides
a workable solution: (i) the right-wrong test should be applied to
all grounds of divorce when the defense of insanity is alleged. This
would insure more uniformity in lower court rulings by eliminating
different and confusing formulas regarding the degree of insanity
necessary to excuse the conduct on each separate ground. (2) The
adoption of a statute similar to Washington's permitting a divorce
when the defendant spouse has been insane for the two year period
prior to the filing of an action. Such a statute makes insanity the
exclusive ground for divorce even though the conduct charged ap-
parently constitutes another ground for divorce, thus preventing the
defendant from being branded a wrongdoer in the eyes of society for
a course of conduct the person was unable to comprehend. (3) In-
sanity of less than two years duration before the filing of the action
should be a defense on any ground.
JOHN P. PLrzoLn
"Shaw v. Shaw, 148 Wash. 622, 269 Pac. 8o4 (1928). Cf., Wolfe v. Wolfe, 42
Wash. 2d 298, 258 P.2d 1211 (1953).
